Stayin’ Alive?: \u3cem\u3eBG Group\u3c/em\u3e, \u3cem\u3ePLC v. Republic of Argentina\u3c/em\u3e and the Vitality of Host-Country Litigation Requirements in Investment Treaty Arbitration by Halpin, Stephen R., III
Washington and Lee Law Review 
Volume 71 Issue 3 Article 8 
Summer 6-1-2014 
Stayin’ Alive?: BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina and the 
Vitality of Host-Country Litigation Requirements in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration 
Stephen R. Halpin III 
Washington and Lee University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen R. Halpin III, Stayin’ Alive?: BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina and the Vitality of 
Host-Country Litigation Requirements in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
1979 (2014), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol71/iss3/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review 
by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, 
please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
1979 
Stayin’ Alive?: BG Group, 
PLC v. Republic of Argentina  
and the Vitality of Host-Country 
Litigation Requirements in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration 
Stephen R. Halpin III∗ 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction ................................................................... 1980 
 II. Background and Sources of Applicable Law 
   in International Arbitration ......................................... 1985 
  A. International Arbitration Defined .......................... 1985 
  B. The Bilateral Investment Treaty Itself ................... 1988 
  C. Host-Country Law ................................................... 1989 
  D. Rules Governing Arbitral Proceedings ................... 1990 
  E. The Seat of Arbitration ........................................... 1992 
  F. Enforcement of International Arbitral  
   Awards ..................................................................... 1993 
 III. The Issue Presented by BG Group: Litigation  
  Before Arbitration ......................................................... 1995 
  A. Factual Background ................................................ 1995 
  B. Denial of Vacatur and Enforcement of the  
   Award in the U.S. District Court for the  
   District of Columbia ................................................ 1999 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 
2015; B.A., University of Virginia, May 2010. I would like to express my deepest 
thanks to Professor Susan D. Franck for her inspiration, good humor, and 
extensive feedback on earlier drafts of this Note. I am also indebted to the 
Volumes 71 and 72 boards for their constant encouragement and editorial 
guidance. Finally, I am incredibly grateful for the support of my family and 
friends, who endured with great aplomb my many fits and starts during the 
writing process. 
1980 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1979 (2014) 
  C. Reversal and Vacatur of the Award in the  
   U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit .............. 2000 
   1. Following First Options ..................................... 2001 
   2. Distinguishing Two Other Domestic  
    Arbitration Precedents ...................................... 2003 
 IV. The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its  
  Implications ................................................................... 2006 
  A. Setting the Stage ..................................................... 2006 
   1. The Majority Opinion ........................................ 2008 
   2. Justice Sotomayor’s Concurrence ...................... 2011 
  B. Potential Implications for International  
   Arbitration in the United States ............................. 2012 
   1. International Investment Treaty  
    Arbitration ......................................................... 2012 
   2. International Commercial Arbitration .............. 2014 
 V. An Improved Host-Country Litigation  
  Requirement .................................................................. 2016 
  A. Proposed Language to Consider .............................. 2017 
  B. Avoiding the Pitfalls in BG Group and  
   Addressing Broader Criticisms of the  
   International Investment Treaty Arbitration  
   Regime ..................................................................... 2019 
   1. Good-Faith Obligation ....................................... 2019 
   2. Stabilization of Applicable Host-Country  
    Law ..................................................................... 2020 
   3. Clear Deference to the Arbitral  
    Tribunal on Challenges to Compliance  
    with the Litigation Requirement....................... 2021 
 VI. Conclusion ...................................................................... 2021 
I. Introduction 
Over the last few decades, international arbitration has 
emerged as the preferred mechanism for resolving international 
investment disputes.1 There are currently in effect over 2,800 
                                                                                                     
 1. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Recent Developments in 
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bilateral investment treaties (BITs),2 agreements “drafted to 
address a specific circumstance: that of an investor of one state 
(the home state) locating assets in the territory of another state 
(the host).”3 Many BITs require or allow foreign investors to 
arbitrate directly against host countries, abrogating sovereign 
immunity.4 Investors in such disputes regularly seek damages 
totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.5 In short, international 
investment treaty arbitration (ITA) involves high monetary 
stakes, implicates issues of international comity, and is here to 
stay. 
Last Term, the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina,6 the first case the Court 
had ever heard concerning an international arbitration award 
rendered pursuant to an investment treaty dispute.7 The case 
raised factual and legal issues that are likely to recur given the 
growing popularity of international arbitration. The BIT in 
question is between two foreign countries—the United Kingdom 
and Argentina—and provides for final, binding resolution of 
                                                                                                     
Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 2 (2013) [hereinafter UNCTAD Recent 
Dev.] (tracking the dramatic increase in the filing of known investor–state 
investment arbitrations between 1987 and 2012). 
 2. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2013 
101 (2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf [hereinafter 
UNCTAD Inv. Rpt.] (noting that there were 2,857 BITs in effect at the end of 
2012). 
 3. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, 
POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 1 (2010). 
 4. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 42 
(2012) (“BITs . . . frequently contain dispute resolution provisions which permit 
foreign investors to require international arbitration . . . of specified categories 
of investment disputes with the host state . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 5. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 57 (2007) (reporting amounts claimed in 
publicly available international investment treaty arbitration awards). 
 6. 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1203 (2014). 
 7. See Diane Marie Amann, Argument Preview: Jurisdictional Say-So in 
Investor–State Arbitrations, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 20, 2013, 2:14 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/argument-preview-jurisdictional-say-so-in-
investor-state-arbitrations/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“This case represents 
the Court’s first consideration of an investor–state dispute arising out of one of 
the thousands of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that countries have 
entered in recent decades.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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disputes by international arbitration.8 The BIT is silent on where 
arbitration should be held, but contains a clause requiring 
litigation of disputes in the host-country’s courts prior to 
international arbitration.9 
In 2003, BG Group PLC (BG), a U.K. entity that had invested 
in Argentina’s energy sector, requested arbitration under the BIT 
against the host country, claiming the Argentine government had 
expropriated BG’s investments in response to a currency crisis.10 
Neither BG nor Argentina litigated the dispute in the Argentine 
courts prior to BG’s request for arbitration.11 The parties selected 
the United States as the seat of arbitration, and in 2007, an 
international arbitral tribunal rendered an award in favor of BG, 
observing that failure to comply with the litigation requirement 
in the BIT did not prevent the tribunal from reaching the merits 
of the dispute.12 
Argentina then petitioned the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia to vacate the award on the ground that BG 
had not accepted Argentina’s standing offer to arbitrate contained 
in the BIT, and thus had not fulfilled the host-country litigation 
requirement.13 According to Argentina, the litigation requirement 
was a condition on its consent to arbitration with an investor.14 
Failing to satisfy the requirement meant the parties had not 
formed an arbitration agreement and in turn that the arbitral 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-U.K., art. 8(4), 
Dec. 11, 1990, http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_argentina.pdf 
[hereinafter Arg.-U.K. BIT] (“The arbitration decision shall be final and binding 
on both Parties.”). 
 9. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text (discussing article 8(2) of 
the BIT). 
 10. See infra notes 99–113 and accompanying text (describing the 
underlying facts leading to arbitration between BG and Argentina). 
 11. Infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 12. Infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. Despite agreeing on an 
arbitral seat, Argentina maintained its position that the parties had not 
actually formed an agreement to arbitrate. See infra note 114 (noting 
Argentina’s objection). 
 13. See infra Part III.B (summarizing the district court’s opinions). 
 14. E.g., infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.15 The district court 
upheld the award, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit reversed and vacated it on appeal.16 The Supreme Court 
granted BG’s petition for certiorari on the question: “In disputes 
involving a multi-staged dispute resolution process, does a court 
or instead the arbitrator determine whether a precondition to 
arbitration has been satisfied?”17 
Throughout briefing and oral argument, the parties 
disagreed about which legal principles the Court should apply to 
determine whether to vacate the award as well as what result 
should follow under those principles. BG and Argentina argued 
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),18 interpreted through 
domestic arbitration case law, provided the proper framework, 
but differed on who should prevail under those authorities.19 The 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ), participating as 
amicus curiae, contended that the Court should engraft an 
international appendage onto its domestic approach in light of 
the distinct nature of the case and remand for further 
proceedings.20 
On March 5, 2014, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, 
holding for BG and sending a clear message to the international 
arbitration community that the jurisprudence the U.S. Supreme 
Court has developed regarding domestic arbitration extends to its 
international counterpart.21 Specifically, if a BIT states that 
disputes will be resolved by final, binding arbitration and the 
parties choose the United States as the seat of arbitration or seek 
to enforce an award pursuant to the BIT in the United States, it 
is proper for U.S. courts to conclude that the treaty partners 
                                                                                                     
 15. See infra note 121 and accompanying text (arguing that the district 
court should vacate the award). 
 16. See infra Part III.C (examining the D.C. Circuit’s opinion). 
 17. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, No. 12-
138 (July 27, 2012). 
 18. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2012). 
 19. See infra Part IV.A (drawing out the parties’ main arguments before 
the Supreme Court). 
 20. See infra Part IV.A (describing oral argument of DOJ). 
 21. See infra Part IV.B (describing potential implications of the Court’s 
decision for international arbitration in the United States). 
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expected U.S. domestic law on vacatur and enforcement to 
control. Under U.S. law, courts afford arbitrators significant 
deference.22 Accordingly, Part IV.B of this Note contends that 
countries and investors using ITA, as well as private parties 
engaging in international commercial arbitration (ICA), will have 
a better idea of what to expect when they arbitrate or seek to 
enforce awards in the United States, allowing them to avoid some 
of the sticky issues that plagued the proceedings between BG and 
Argentina.23 
But what about Argentina and the text of the treaty, which 
plainly insists upon host-country litigation prior to arbitration?24 
What about the broader criticism that the current ITA regime 
shortchanges host-country sovereignty in order to please foreign 
investors?25 Or that host-country courts are better positioned 
than international arbitral tribunals to decide questions of 
host-country law, even if the arbitrators have the final say?26 
These concerns deserve a response if ITA is to maintain its 
prominence, notwithstanding the Court’s arbitration-friendly 
decision in BG Group. Part V proposes a novel solution in the 
form of an improved host-country litigation requirement that 
stabilizes host-country law at the time of investment.27 Part VI 
concludes that countries should learn from BG Group and 
                                                                                                     
 22. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 
671–72 (2010) (“It is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and 
application of the agreement and effectively dispense[s] his own brand of 
industrial justice that his decision may be unenforceable.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 
 23. Infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
 24. See infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text (reproducing and 
discussing parts of the U.K.–Argentina BIT’s dispute-resolution section). 
 25. See BORN, supra note 4, at 419 (noting that “investment arbitration has 
generated substantial criticism” and that three countries have recently given 
notice of withdrawal from a major multilateral treaty, “claiming that 
investment arbitration erodes national sovereignty and favors foreign investors” 
(citation omitted)). 
 26. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor 
Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 876 (2005) (“In 
most instances, the presumption must be that a national court is best suited to 
interpret national laws.” (citing JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (2005))). 
 27. Infra Part V. 
STAYIN’ ALIVE? 1985 
implement or improve host-country litigation requirements in 
their BITs.28 
Before addressing the implications of BG Group for 
international arbitration in the United States and proposing an 
improved host-country litigation requirement, some context is 
necessary. Part II provides background on international 
arbitration and briefly introduces a few of the various sources of 
applicable law at play, including the role of host-country law and 
the law of the seat of arbitration.29 Part III fills an existing gap in 
the literature by summarizing in depth the BG Group decisions 
in the lower federal courts, including the important U.S. 
arbitration precedents relied upon by the parties and courts.30 
Part IV.A builds on the analysis in Part III and draws from the 
oral argument before the Supreme Court in December 2013 to 
illuminate the March 2014 decision.31 
II. Background and Sources of Applicable Law in International 
Arbitration 
Subpart A defines “international arbitration” and 
distinguishes the two prominent types while highlighting shared 
issues regarding applicable law.32 The remaining subparts 
overview some, but not all, sources of applicable law: the BIT 
itself, host-country law, rules governing proceedings before the 
arbitral tribunal, the law of the situs (or seat of arbitration), and 
the law governing enforcement of awards.33 
A. International Arbitration Defined 
International arbitration is a dispute-resolution mechanism. In 
its simplest form, “arbitration” involves the submission of a dispute, 
                                                                                                     
 28. Infra Part VI. 
 29. Infra Part II. 
 30. Infra Part III. 
 31. Infra Part IV.A. 
 32. Infra Part II.A. 
 33. Infra Part II.B–F. 
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at the request of adverse parties, to a private, independent third 
party for adjudication.34 The disputing parties agree they will be 
bound by the third-party’s decision,35 and to that end, often seek 
decision makers who are well-respected and possess subject-matter 
expertise.36 It bears emphasis that arbitration is a creature of 
contract. Party consent is a necessary condition.37 
Broadly speaking, “international” encompasses matters that “in 
some way transcend national boundaries.”38 Different countries’ 
arbitration laws define “international” in different ways.39 For the 
purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to point out that the FAA 
controls which arbitrations conducted in the United States are 
considered domestic and which are international.40 Section 202 of 
the FAA frames which arbitrations are international41 and carves 
out which disputes are domestic.42 
                                                                                                     
 34. See NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, REDFERN AND HUNTER 
ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1–2 (5th ed. 2009) (tracing the origins of 
arbitration); BORN, supra note 4, at 4 (“[V]irtually all authorities accept that 
arbitration is . . . a process by which parties consensually submit a dispute to a 
non-governmental decision-maker, selected by or for the parties, to render a 
binding decision . . . .”). 
 35. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 2 (explaining that 
parties to a dispute are bound by an arbitrator’s decision because they agree to 
be, not “because of the coercive power of any State”); BORN, supra note 4, at 5 
(“[A]rbitration . . . produces a binding award that decides the parties’ dispute in 
a final manner and is subject only to limited grounds for challenge in national 
courts.”). 
 36. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 1 (observing that parties 
may pick an arbitrator “whose expertise or judgment they trust”). 
 37. See BORN, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that “[i]t is elementary that 
‘arbitration’ is a consensual process that requires the agreement of the parties”). 
 38. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 8. 
 39. Cf. infra Part II.D–F (noting that different countries have different 
rules for conducting arbitrations and reviewing arbitration awards). 
 40. See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (laying out which arbitration agreements or 
awards are international and covered by the New York Convention and which 
are wholly domestic). 
 41. See id. (“An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a 
legal relationship . . . falls under the [New York] Convention.”). 
 42. See id. (“An [arbitration] . . . which is entirely between citizens of the 
United States shall be deemed not to fall under the [New York] Convention 
unless [the dispute] . . . involves property located abroad, envisages performance 
or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more 
foreign states.”). 
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There are two major types of international arbitration: 
international commercial arbitration (ICA) and international 
investment treaty arbitration (ITA).43 Stated simply, ICA 
“involve[s] commercial disputes between privates parties,” and 
ITA typically involves arbitration by an investor against a 
sovereign country,44 oftentimes under a BIT.45 Although ICA and 
ITA are separate subjects, they overlap considerably.46 A 
practical issue that arises in both contexts is which law applies to 
a particular aspect of a given dispute. 
In ICA, arbitrators generally have significant flexibility in 
determining applicable law, and oftentimes awards rendered in 
such proceedings will not contain “substantial legal developments 
beyond the application of general principles of law.”47 Resolution 
of commercial disputes turns predominantly on “the provisions 
contained in the agreement of the parties, taking into 
consideration the facts of the case as they appear from the 
documents submitted by counsel and the witness hearing.”48 By 
contrast, ITA requires an arbitral tribunal “to perform very 
substantial, multi-step, legal work before reaching its final 
decision.”49 The tribunal must inquire into its jurisdiction to hear 
the claim and whether the claimant has standing to bring the 
                                                                                                     
 43. See BORN, supra note 4, at 41 (observing that “[m]ost international 
arbitrations are international commercial arbitrations,” but “[a]nother 
significant . . . category of international arbitration involves ‘investor-state’ or 
‘investment’ arbitrations”). 
 44. See id. at 411 (introducing the basics of investor–state arbitration). 
 45. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 468–69 (explaining that 
“[i]n light of the dramatic increase in the number of BITs and the emergence of 
clearer legal principles through case law, the number of investor-State 
arbitrations has mushroomed” (citation omitted)). 
 46. See, e.g., Campbell McLachlan, Investment Treaty Arbitration: The 
Legal Framework, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 95, 98 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 
2009) (noting that “despite the treaty context, investment treaty dispute 
settlement uses the forms and procedures of commercial arbitration”). 
 47. Bernard Hanotiau, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Commercial 
Arbitration: Are They Different Ball Games? The Legal Regime/Framework, in 
50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
CONFERENCE, supra note 46, at 146, 146–47. 
 48. Id. at 147. 
 49. Id. at 148. 
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claim.50 Divining the applicable law is a more complicated task 
than in the strictly commercial context. A BIT is often thought of 
as a “self-contained legal system,”51 and choice-of-law provisions 
in BITs frequently direct a tribunal to consider, among others, 
“the BIT itself, the law of the Contracting State, [and] the rules 
and principles of international law.”52 
B. The Bilateral Investment Treaty Itself 
Historically, investments made by foreign entities in other 
countries carried substantial risk.53 Under bilateral treaties of 
friendship, commerce, and navigation—precursors to modern 
BITs—“[t]he primary form of dispute resolution was in local 
courts” with possible international arbitration between the two 
countries.54 That is, investors lacked the ability to arbitrate 
directly against a host country and instead were frequently 
required to exhaust local remedies in the host-country’s courts, 
after which they could seek diplomatic aid from their own country 
if their efforts had not proven fruitful.55 This policy “conserve[d] 
the resources of the home-state government by deflecting claims 
that could be resolved by the investor in local courts” and 
“preserve[d] the dignity of the host state by providing it with an 
opportunity to rectify a violation of law and to accord justice to 
the investor under its own law.”56 Investors were not particularly 
fond of this slow brand of justice and wanted more protection for 
                                                                                                     
 50. See id. (“In investment arbitration, the issue of jurisdiction is nearly 
invariably raised by the respondent. It leads the arbitral tribunal to determine 
whether claimant has standing . . . , but also whether it qualifies for protection 
under the applicable BIT . . . .”). 
 51. Richard H. Kreindler, The Law Applicable to International Investment 
Disputes, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL AND 
SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 401, 404 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Michael Kröll 
eds., 2004). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 3, at 38 (observing that, in the aftermath 
of World War I, many governments engaged in “large scale expropriations of 
foreign investment . . . as an instrument of economic policy”). 
 54. Id. at 24. 
 55. See id. at 428 (explaining the policy of “espousal”). 
 56. Id. 
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their investments.57 At about the same time, many countries 
desired to attract more foreign capital, leading to increased usage 
of BITs that included international arbitration.58 
C. Host-Country Law 
Host-country law retains significance in international 
investment disputes, notwithstanding the BIT movement and its 
focus on international law.59 For example, “the typical definition 
of an investment found in a BIT requires that the status of the 
asset claimed to be an investment must be considered under the 
host State’s domestic property law.”60 Unfortunately, BITs do not 
always provide clear textual guidance on the applicable law,61 
and those that do often fail to address head-on the appropriate 
balance between international and host-country law.62 
Most can agree that wedding investors to a body of law that 
is subject to change by the host country at any time is 
unpalatable,63 but BITs such as the one between the United 
                                                                                                     
 57. See id. at 3 (“Capital exporting states created the BITs to protect their 
investment abroad . . . .”). 
 58. See id. at 63–64 (discussing how developing countries’ increased desire 
to attract foreign investment beginning in the late-1980s after the Cold War Era 
and the concurrent “revolution in information technology” contributed to the 
relatively recent surge in BITs). 
 59. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW 
WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 
69–70 (2007) (“The investments of non-State actors are creatures of private law 
and tribunals cannot avoid addressing issues arising under the law pursuant to 
which investments owe their existence in adjudicating treaty questions.”). 
 60. Id. at 182. 
 61. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 483 (observing that 
“BITs do not always contain specific provisions on the law to be applied by the 
arbitral tribunals appointed to resolve disputes” (footnote omitted)). 
 62. See id. at 483–84 (explaining that “BITs that do contain applicable law 
provisions usually list the provisions of the BIT, international law, and domestic 
law, without indicating which is pre-eminent or how they are to be combined”). 
By way of example, Blackaby and Partasides lay out the choice-of-law provision 
from the Argentina–United Kingdom BIT. Id. at 484. 
 63. See Guido Santiago Tawil, 2.6 Applicable Law, in UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ICSID 1, 15 
(Rubens Ricupero ed., 2003), available at http://r0.unctad.org/disputesettlement/ 
course.htm (noting that “[s]ubsequent changes in the applicable [host-country] 
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Kingdom and Argentina lack a strong textual defense against 
this possibility.64 As a result, an investor may include a 
stabilization clause in a subsequent agreement with the host 
country concerning the investment.65 A stabilization clause 
provides a means for investors to insulate their investments from 
disadvantageous changes in host-country law.66 BITs themselves 
do not typically contain stabilization clauses, perhaps because 
countries party to the treaty do not want to relinquish the power 
to alter their laws freely.67 
D. Rules Governing Arbitral Proceedings 
Parties may specify in their agreements or treaties that when 
a dispute arises arbitration will be conducted on an ad hoc basis 
or that the parties will seek varying levels of assistance from 
specialized arbitration institutions.68 The United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), created 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, puts forth texts 
on various subjects of international trade law, including dispute 
                                                                                                     
law may have a severe impact on the investment” and “may go as far as the 
termination of the contract and the expropriation of the investor’s property”). 
 64. See Arg.-U.K. BIT, supra note 8, at art. 8 (noting with regard to 
applicable host-country law that “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute 
in accordance with . . . the laws of the Contracting Party [host country] involved 
in the dispute, including its rules on conflict of laws”). 
 65. See JEFF WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 990 (2012) (observing that “[i]t is particularly prevalent in 
investment agreements to incorporate stabilisation clauses that seek to limit the 
impact on the parties to the laws in existence at the time the agreement was 
entered into”). 
 66. See id. (“One way to prevent the effect of subsequent changes is to 
introduce a stabilisation clause into the investment agreement. Such a clause 
protects the investor from subsequent changes of the local law.”). 
 67. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION 
AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 166 (4th ed. 2013) (noting that 
stabilization clauses “are generally used only in agreements between foreign 
investors and states or state-owned entities, where the possibilities for 
legislative interference are most substantial”). 
 68. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 52–57 (discussing the 
comparative strengths and weaknesses of ad hoc arbitration and institutional 
arbitration). 
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resolution.69 One such text contains the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules (UNCITRAL Rules), which are based in part on the notion 
“that the establishment of rules for ad hoc arbitration that are 
acceptable in countries with different legal, social and economic 
systems . . . significantly contribute[s] to the development of 
harmonious international economic relations.”70 The UNCITRAL 
Rules provide a procedural framework that parties may invoke 
wholesale or strategically alter at their agreement.71 
Prominent institutions offering international arbitration 
services include the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), and the London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA).72 These institutions do not adjudicate disputes but 
instead administer disputes initiated under the institution’s 
rules.73 Many BIT disputes are resolved through either 
institutional arbitration under ICSID or ad hoc arbitration under 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.74 
                                                                                                     
 69. See UNCITRAL, A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL: BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE 
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1 (2013) (describing 
its “mandate [as] to further the progressive harmonization and modernization of 
the law of international trade by preparing and promoting the use and adoption 
of legislative and non-legislative instruments in a number of key areas” 
(footnote omitted)). “Those [key] areas include dispute resolution . . . .” Id. 
 70. See G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17 (Dec. 15, 
1976) (requesting broad distribution of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). The 
Rules were subsequently revised in 2010. G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/65/22 (Dec. 6, 2010). 
 71. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 1(1) (2010) 
(“Where parties have agreed that disputes between them in respect of a defined 
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, shall be referred to arbitration 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, then such disputes shall be settled in 
accordance with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may 
agree.”). 
 72. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 54 (listing examples of 
the “better known” arbitration institutions). 
 73. See, e.g., Functions of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, INT’L 
CHAMBER OF COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/About-ICC/Organization/Dispute-
Resolution-Services/ICC-International-Court-of-Arbitration/Functions-of-the-
ICC-International-Court-of-Arbitration/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (outlining 
administrative and procedural responsibilities) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 74. See BORN, supra note 4, at 412 (explaining that “many BIT arbitrations 
are conducted under general institutional rules, such as the UNCITRAL Rules,” 
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E. The Seat of Arbitration 
Once parties have agreed where to arbitrate, the law of the 
seat of arbitration (law of the situs or lex arbitri) provides 
procedural rules that parties must follow during arbitration.75 
The lex arbitri also sets forth the grounds on which parties may 
vacate an arbitral award.76 In the United States, the FAA grants 
the U.S. federal district court embracing the location where an 
award is made the power to vacate the award on certain 
procedural grounds.77 Although the Supreme Court has not 
expressly held that the FAA provides the sole grounds for 
vacating awards rendered in the United States, recent decisions 
reflect this understanding.78 
                                                                                                     
or under “specialized and sui generis dispute resolution mechanisms,” such as 
ICSID). 
 75. See WAINCYMER, supra note 65, at 147 (explaining that “[t]he law of the 
Seat or place of arbitration generally plays a central role in arbitral 
proceedings” and “will, in most cases, form the lex arbitri”). Under such an 
arrangement, national courts may be tasked with resolving “timing issue[s]” and 
other “supervisory functions in relation to jurisdictional determinations.” Id. at 
149. 
 76. See WAINCYMER, supra note 65, at 147 (“An award that does not comply 
with [the] norms [of the lex arbitri] can be annulled or enforcement can be 
refused on that basis.”). 
 77. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (“In any of the following cases the United 
States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an 
order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the 
arbitration . . . .”). 
 78. See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–12 
(2013) (declining to allow “[r]espondents [to] invoke a judge-made exception to 
the FAA” to invalidate an arbitration agreement); AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–53 (2011) (holding that the respondents could 
not rely on California’s doctrine of unconscionability to invalidate a consumer 
contract in which they had waived class-action arbitration because the FAA 
preempts state law regarding enforceability of arbitration clauses); Hall St. 
Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008) (holding that the FAA’s 
statutory grounds for “expedited judicial review to confirm, vacate, or modify 
arbitration awards” are “exclusive” and may not be “supplemented by contract”). 
For an analysis of the clouded history attending whether “manifest disregard” 
exists as another ground on which an award may be vacated under U.S. law, see 
Patrick Sweeney, Note, Exceeding Their Powers: A Critique of Stolt-Nielsen and 
Manifest Disregard, and a Proposal for Substantive Arbitral Award Review, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1571, 1585–1608 (2014). 
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Typically, only national courts at the seat of arbitration have 
the power to vacate or annul awards rendered within a country’s 
borders.79 Even if an award has not been vacated at the seat, the 
prevailing party will have to enforce the award if the losing party 
does not comply voluntarily.80 
F. Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards 
Arbitral tribunals, lacking the coercive power that national 
courts enjoy, cannot compel compliance with their awards.81 
Fortunately, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)82 and the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention)83 are 
two major treaties that facilitate transnational enforcement of 
international arbitral awards.84 There are currently 152 countries 
party to the New York Convention85 and 159 countries signatory 
                                                                                                     
 79. See BORN, supra note 4, at 307 (“[B]oth the New York Convention and 
national arbitration statutes . . . prohibit[] actions to annul awards outside the 
state where the award was made . . . .”). 
 80. Infra Part II.F. 
 81. See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION 676 
(paperback ed. 2011) (explaining that arbitrators “lack[] any direct compulsory 
power” and that “[a]rbitrator-sanctioned seizure of assets . . . would in most 
countries amount to vigilante justice, as governments jealously retain their 
general police powers”). 
 82. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 
(entered into force June 7, 1959). 
 83. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966). 
 84. See Gary B. Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 
DUKE L.J. 775, 837–38 (2012) (discussing how under both the New York 
Convention and the ICSID Convention, “effective enforcement [of arbitral 
awards] is available in national courts”). 
 85. Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE 
L., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention 
_status.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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to the ICSID Convention.86 For present purposes, it is important 
to note that the FAA implements the New York Convention’s 
grounds for enforcement of arbitral awards.87 
Unlike vacatur (or annulment) of an award, enforcement may 
occur in many places. If the country embracing the situs of the 
arbitration is a party to the New York Convention, the award can 
be enforced in any other country party to the Convention, subject 
to limitations imposed by domestic law.88 An award rendered in 
an ICSID proceeding imposes a similar obligation and shields 
awards from national court review.89 Given the efficacy of these 
international treaties on enforcement, losing parties often comply 
without a formal challenge.90 
                                                                                                     
 86. Member States, INT’L CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISP., 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionV
al=ShowHome&pageName=MemberStates_Home (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 87. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (“The Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in 
United States courts in accordance with this chapter.”); id. § 202 (“An 
arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship, 
whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a 
transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls 
under the Convention.”). 
 88. See BORN, supra note 4, at 377–78 (noting that the New York 
Convention “imposes a general obligation on Contracting States to recognize 
awards made in other countries”). 
 89. See id. at 428 
[N]othing in the ICSID Convention permits courts in a Contracting 
State to review the tribunal’s jurisdiction, procedural decisions or 
other actions, or to consider objections based on local public 
policy . . . . Rather, Contracting States are required . . . to treat 
awards as binding and to recognize them without any judicial 
review . . . . 
 90. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 623 (stating that “the 
vast majority of [international commercial arbitration] awards are performed 
voluntarily”). But see UNCTAD Recent Dev., supra note 1, at 24 (“Enforcing 
[investment treaty arbitration] awards against sovereign States remains a 
difficult issue . . . .”). 
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III. The Issue Presented by BG Group: Litigation Before 
Arbitration 
With some basic principles in mind, this Part III turns to BG 
Group. A comprehensive discussion of the lower-court decisions 
and the precedents relied upon sharpens understanding of this 
complex dispute. Accordingly, after reviewing the underlying 
facts and arbitral proceedings that led to an award in BG’s 
favor,91 this Part examines the fight over vacatur and 
enforcement in the lower federal courts. The U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia decided not to vacate the award and 
instead confirmed it.92 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit reversed.93 The Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari and heard oral argument in the case on 
December 2, 2013.94 The Court issued its opinion on March 5, 
2014.95 
A. Factual Background 
Historically, those seeking to invest in a foreign country 
faced significant hurdles to ensure protection of their 
investments.96 The United Kingdom and Argentina signed a 
bilateral investment treaty on December 11, 1990 to promote 
cross-border investment and generate economic growth in each 
country.97 Article 2 of the BIT protects foreign investments by 
promising that the investments “shall at all times be accorded 
fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection and 
constant security.”98 
                                                                                                     
 91. Infra Part III.A. 
 92. Infra Part III.B. 
 93. Infra Part III.C. 
 94. Infra Part IV. 
 95. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1198 (2014). 
 96. See supra Part II.B (discussing the emergence of BITs). 
 97. See Arg.-U.K. BIT, supra note 8, at 1 (stating reasons for the countries’ 
agreement to the BIT). 
 98. Id. at Art. 2(2). Article 2 provides, in full: 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable 
conditions for investors of the other Contracting Party to invest 
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With the BIT and its key provisions in effect, BG Group PLC, 
a United Kingdom corporation,99 invested in Argentina.100 When 
Argentina privatized its gas industry, BG secured a significant 
ownership interest in MetroGAS, one of the previously state-run 
gas utilities.101 By 1998, BG controlled approximately 45% of 
MetroGAS.102 In late 2000, after struggles in Mexico and Brazil, 
there were rumblings that Argentina might be the next Latin 
American country to fall victim to a currency crisis.103 Faced with 
continuing economic stagnation, Argentina took steps in June 
2001 towards delinking the Argentine peso from its strict 
one-to-one peg to the American dollar.104 In doing so, the 
                                                                                                     
capital in its territory, and, subject to its right to exercise powers 
conferred by its laws, shall admit such capital. 
(2) Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all 
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy 
protection and constant security in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way 
impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments in its 
territory of investors of the other Contracting Party. Each 
Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered 
into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting 
Party. 
 99. See BG Group Plc. v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, at 5 (Dec. 24, 
2007), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0081.pdf [hereinafter 
Final Award] (noting that BG Group is “a British corporation located . . . in the 
United Kingdom”). 
 100. See id. at 47 (concluding that “BG’s ownership interest . . . is an 
‘Investment’ for the purposes of Article 1(a)(ii) of the Argentina–U.K. BIT”). 
 101. See id. at 10–12 (explaining Argentina’s restructuring of its gas 
industry for the purposes of privatization, including the creation of several 
distribution companies, and the successful bid by a group of investors that 
included BG for ownership of MetroGAS, one of the distribution companies). 
 102. See id. at 12 (“Between 1994 and 1998, BG increased its investment in 
MetroGAS from 28.7% . . . to 45.11% . . . .”). 
 103. See Larry Rohter, Argentina’s Economy Casts a Shadow, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 18, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/18/business/international-
business-argentina-s-economy-casts-a-shadow.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) 
(describing how Argentina had difficulty “maintain[ing] the [Argentine] peso’s 
one-to-one link with the American dollar, becoming the region’s biggest 
borrower in the process”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 104. See Clifford Krauss, Argentina Moves to Overhaul Peso’s Peg to the 
Dollar, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/19/ 
business/argentina-moves-to-overhaul-peso-s-peg-to-the-dollar.html (last visited 
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government sought to make Argentine exports relatively cheaper 
and thus more attractive in the global marketplace.105 On 
January 6, 2002, Argentina “formally abandoned” its peg of the 
peso to the dollar and devalued its currency.106 
Up until this point, recently privatized gas utilities could 
collect tariffs107 and seek adjustments of the tariffs to keep pace 
with inflation.108 But in light of Argentina’s persistent currency 
problems, including the move away from its strict peg to the U.S. 
dollar, the methodology for calculating tariffs became a source of 
intractable conflict for MetroGAS and its regulators.109 In fact, 
BG’s main contention in pursuing arbitration was that 
MetroGAS’s inability to increase tariffs and collect the additional 
revenue put the business in a financially untenable position.110 
Article 8 of the United Kingdom–Argentina BIT lays out the 
process for settling disputes between an investor and a host 
country.111 Article 8(2) states: 
[D]isputes shall be submitted to international arbitration in 
the following cases: 
(a) if one of the Parties so requests, in any of the following 
circumstances: 
                                                                                                     
Sept. 24, 2014) (reporting that “Argentina has announced a complex set of new 
economic policies,” including implementation of a “floating exchange rate”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 105. See id. (noting that the steps “should help Argentina’s competiveness in 
Brazil, Chile and Europe, the markets for two-thirds of its exports”). 
 106. Larry Rohter, Argentina Unlinks Peso from Dollar, Bracing for 
Devaluation and Even Harder Times, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/07/world/argentina-unlinks-peso-from-dollar-
bracing-for-devaluation-and-even-harder-times.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 107. See Final Award, supra note 99, at 13–20 (discussing the relevant 
Argentine “Gas Law,” “Gas Decree,” and “The MetroGAS License,” which formed 
the regulatory environment for MetroGAS’s operations). 
 108. See id. at 18 (laying out the tariff adjustment provisions of the 
MetroGAS license). 
 109. See id. at 22–29 (describing the various steps taken by the Argentine 
government that prevented MetroGAS from adjusting its tariffs). 
 110. See id. at 29 (summarizing BG’s prayer for relief). 
 111. See Arg.-U.K. BIT, supra note 8, at art. 8 (“Settlement of Disputes 
Between an Investor and the Host State”). 
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(i) where, after a period of eighteen months has elapsed from 
the moment when the dispute was submitted to the competent 
tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose territory the 
investment was made, the said tribunal has not given its final 
decision; 
(ii) where the final decision of the aforementioned tribunal has 
been made but the Parties are still in dispute; 
(b) where the Contracting Party and the investor of the other 
Contracting Party have so agreed.112 
On its face, Article 8 contemplates that an investor or State can 
initiate arbitration only after a period of litigation in the 
host-country’s national court system unless the parties to a 
dispute agree otherwise.113 Nevertheless, having declined to first 
litigate in Argentina or otherwise secure Argentina’s permission 
to bypass litigation, investor BG filed its “Notice of Arbitration” 
in 2003.114 On December 24, 2007, the arbitral tribunal, having 
conducted the proceedings in the United States115 according to 
the UNCITRAL Rules,116 held that Argentina had breached the 
BIT and directed Argentina to pay BG approximately $185 
million in damages.117 The tribunal explained that, “[a]s a matter 
of treaty interpretation . . . [the litigation requirement in] Article 
8(2)(a)(i) cannot be construed as an absolute impediment to 
arbitration.”118 Unhappy with the result from proceedings it had 
                                                                                                     
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. (establishing that arbitration is only available if either: one 
party has first litigated for eighteen months in the host-country’s courts; or the 
investor and host country agree to proceed directly to arbitration). 
 114. See Final Award, supra note 99, at 5, 48 (noting the date of BG’s 
request for arbitration and Argentina’s objection that “failure by BG to bring its 
grievance to Argentine courts for 18 months renders its claim . . . inadmissible”). 
 115. Final Award, supra note 99, at 1 (noting that Washington, D.C., was 
the “[f]ormal seat of the arbitration”). 
 116. See id. at 7 (“Because the Parties failed to agree on submission of the 
dispute to [ICSID], BG submitted to arbitration under [the UNICTRAL 
Rules]. . . . The Parties designated arbitrators in accordance with Article 7(1) of 
the UNCITRAL Rules.”). 
 117. See id. at 138 (“The Republic of Argentina breached Article 2.2 of the 
Argentina–U.K. BIT[] [and] . . . shall pay BG Group Plc. the sum of 
US$185,285,485.85.”). 
 118. Id. at 50. 
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not wholeheartedly embraced, Argentina petitioned to vacate the 
award in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.119 
B. Denial of Vacatur and Enforcement of the Award in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia 
In Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC,120 Argentina 
asserted that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
claims because BG had not litigated in the Argentine courts prior 
to requesting arbitration.121 In conducting its analysis, the 
district court used the FAA to assess the bases for vacating an 
arbitration award rendered in the United States.122 The court 
stressed the narrowness of its inquiry, noting that “careful 
scrutiny of an arbitrator’s decision would frustrate the FAA’s 
‘emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution,’”123 
and that “under a more searching, appellate-style review, the 
arguments presented by Argentina . . . could very well carry the 
day.”124 Finding no grounds in the FAA on which to vacate or 
modify the award,125 the court upheld the award, reasoning that 
“Argentina ha[d] not met its burden of showing that the arbitral 
panel exceeded its authority by entertaining BG Group’s claims,” 
and the tribunal had “correctly turned to the text of Article 
8(2)(a)(i) of the Investment Treaty and relevant international law 
sources in attempting to discern its jurisdiction.”126 
                                                                                                     
 119. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 
(D.D.C. 2010) (noting that Argentina seeks to “vacate or modify [the] arbitral 
award”). 
 120. 715 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 121. See id. at 121 (noting that Argentina asserted inter alia that “the Court 
must vacate the Award under Section 10(a)(4) [of the FAA] because the arbitral 
panel improperly permitt[ed] BG to arbitrate its claims before seeking recourse 
in the Argentina courts” (quotation omitted)). 
 122. See id. at 115 (“The Court’s authority to vacate an arbitral award is 
governed by 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) . . . .”). 
 123. Id. at 116 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)). 
 124. Id. at 126. 
 125. See id. at 121–25 (examining and rejecting Argentina’s various 
arguments for vacatur or modification of the award). 
 126. Id. at 121–22. 
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Argentina later filed a separate claim on whether the district 
court should refuse to deny enforcement of the award pursuant to 
the “public policy” exception in the New York Convention.127 The 
court confirmed the award,128 explaining that Argentina “failed to 
identify any fundamental public policy that implicates this 
country’s most basic notions of morality and justice.”129 The court 
concluded it was bound by the tribunal’s interpretation of Article 
8(2) of the BIT in determining whether Argentina had consented 
to arbitration.130 
C. Reversal and Vacatur of the Award in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court. It determined 
that Argentina’s agreement to arbitrate was conditioned on 
investors first litigating in Argentina.131 The circuit court framed 
two central issues: (1) whether the United Kingdom and 
Argentina had intended under the BIT that an investor could 
seek arbitration without first litigating for eighteen months; and 
(2) whether the countries intended for a court or arbitrator to 
resolve such a question.132 As explained below, the second issue 
                                                                                                     
 127. Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 764 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26–27 
(D.D.C. 2011). 
 128. See id. at 39 (“[T]he Court concludes that the Award must be confirmed, 
and that BG Group is entitled to damages . . . .”). 
 129. Id. at 27 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 130. See id. at 32–34 (explaining that “the Court is without authority to 
deviate from the arbitral panel’s interpretation of the Investment Treaty in 
determining whether enforcement of the Award would contravene the public 
policy of the United States”). 
 131. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1370 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (explaining that the UNCITRAL Rules governing arbitration under 
the BIT were not triggered because BG never satisfied the litigation 
precondition). 
 132. See id. at 1369 
The “gateway” question in this appeal is arbitrability: when the 
United Kingdom and Argentina executed the Treaty, did they, as 
contracting parties, intend that an investor under the Treaty could 
seek arbitration without first fulfilling Article 8(1)’s requirement that 
recourse initially be sought in a court of the contracting party where 
the investment was made? That question raises the antecedent 
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turns on whether the provision at issue goes to the substance of 
the dispute or is instead procedural in nature. 
1. Following First Options 
Because the D.C. Circuit rested its opinion largely on the test 
from First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,133 the case deserves 
close discussion. The parties involved were First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. (First Options), Manuel Kaplan, Kaplan’s wife 
Carol, and Kaplan’s company—MK Investments, Inc. (MKI).134 
First Options was a brokerage firm that “clear[ed] stock trades on 
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange.”135 MKI had a trading account 
with First Options, and as a result of the 1987 financial crash, 
MKI and the Kaplans accrued significant debt with First Options, 
an issue the parties attempted to resolve in a series of “‘workout’ 
agreements.”136 One of the agreements, signed by MKI but not 
the Kaplans personally, contained an arbitration clause.137 First 
Options subsequently sought arbitration against MKI and the 
Kaplans pursuant to that clause.138 
The arbitral panel determined that it had jurisdiction over 
the parties and claims and rendered an award in favor of First 
Options.139 Although a federal district court refused to vacate the 
award at the Kaplans’ request, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
“agreed with the Kaplans that their dispute was not 
arbitrable.”140 Thus, the central issues before the Supreme Court 
were: “(1) how a district court should review an arbitrator’s 
decision that the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, and 
                                                                                                     
question of whether the contracting parties intended the answer to be 
provided by a court or an arbitrator. 
 133. 514 U.S. 939 (1995). 
 134. Id. at 939. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 941. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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(2) how a court of appeals should review a district court’s decision 
confirming, or refusing to vacate, an arbitration award.”141 
Regarding the first issue, the Court explained that “[c]ourts 
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence 
that they did so.”142 Here, the Kaplans had not personally signed 
a contract to arbitrate disputes with First Options,143 and the fact 
that they appeared at the arbitration proceedings to protest the 
arbitrators’ jurisdiction did not preclude them from later 
asserting that they had not agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.144 
Accordingly, the Court found that “First Options cannot show 
that the Kaplans clearly agreed to have the arbitrators decide . . . 
the question of arbitrability.”145 
In resolving the second issue, the Court declined to fashion a 
modified standard of review for courts of appeals reviewing 
district court decisions on whether to vacate an arbitration award 
under the FAA.146 Instead, courts of appeals in such instances are 
instructed to review district court decisions under “ordinary, not 
special standards,” meaning that they “accept[] findings of fact 
that are not clearly erroneous but decid[e] questions of law de 
novo.”147 
No facts in First Options implicated international concerns. 
The dispute was wholly domestic.148 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit 
followed this precedent in BG Group, explaining that “the intent 
of the contracting parties controls whether the answer to the 
question of arbitrability is to be provided by a court or an 
                                                                                                     
 141. Id. at 940. 
 142. Id. at 944 (quoting AT&T Tech. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 
643, 649 (1986)). 
 143. Id. at 941. 
 144. See id. at 946 (explaining that it made sense for the Kaplans to be 
present at the proceedings given that MKI was arbitrating disputes with First 
Options and noting that “Third Circuit law . . . suggested that the Kaplans 
might argue arbitrability to the arbitrators without losing their right to 
independent court review” (citation omitted)). 
 145. Id. at 945. 
 146. Id. at 948. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text. 
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arbitrator,”149 and intent must indicate there is “clear and 
unmistakable evidence” that the parties sought to “arbitrate 
arbitrability.”150 As evidence of intent, the D.C. Circuit noted that 
the text of the BIT did not expressly address the particular facts 
of the case: when an investor who has not litigated in the 
host-country’s courts as directed by the BIT immediately pursues 
international arbitration.151 Accordingly, the court concluded that 
there was not clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to 
arbitrate disputes unless an investor had satisfied the litigation 
requirement of Article 8.152 In other words, compliance with the 
litigation requirement was necessary to signal that both BG and 
Argentina intended to arbitrate any outstanding disputes. 
2. Distinguishing Two Other Domestic Arbitration Precedents 
The D.C. Circuit also distinguished its decision from two 
other precedents.153 In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,154 
the Supreme Court concluded that a court should answer the 
threshold question of arbitrability when there is a dispute over 
whether a successor firm after a merger is bound under an 
                                                                                                     
 149. Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 943). The court labeled the arbitrability 
inquiry a “‘gateway’ question,” id., explaining that “[a] court will decide the 
question ‘in the kind of narrow circumstances where the contracting parties 
would likely have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter . . . .’” Id. 
(quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter, 537 U.S. 79, 123 (2002)). 
 150. Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing First 
Options, 514 U.S. at 943). 
 151. See id. at 1371 (“The Treaty does not directly answer whether the 
contracting parties intended a court or the arbitrator to determine the questions 
of arbitrability where the precondition of resort to a contracting party’s court 
pursuant to Article 8(1) and (2) is disregarded by an investor.”). 
 152. See id. at 1370–71 (noting that the UNCITRAL Rules, under which the 
arbitration was subsequently conducted, would provide clear and unmistakable 
evidence of intent to arbitrate, but those Rules could be “triggered[] . . . only 
after an Argentine court first has an opportunity to resolve the dispute”). 
 153. See id. at 1372 (discussing why the court of appeals’s decision is not at 
odds with John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964)); id. at 
1372 n.6 (asserting that Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 
(2002), “is also distinguishable”). 
 154. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
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arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated 
by a predecessor firm and a labor union.155 But the John Wiley 
Court then decided that the successor firm was required to 
arbitrate in part because of “[t]he preference of national labor 
policy for arbitration.”156 On this point, the D.C. Circuit, faced 
with a bilateral investment treaty between two foreign countries 
rather than a domestic labor dispute, departed from the result 
reached in John Wiley.157  
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,158 the Supreme 
Court instructed that certain procedural issues do not really 
constitute independent “questions of arbitrability” and are 
presumptively for an arbitrator to resolve, not a court.159 In 
                                                                                                     
 155. See id. at 547 (“Here, the question is whether Wiley, which did not 
itself sign the collective bargaining agreement on which the Union’s claim to 
arbitration depends, is bound at all by the agreement’s arbitration provision.”). 
In John Wiley, a labor union represented about half the employees of a 
publishing firm. Id. at 545. The union had negotiated a collective bargaining 
agreement with the publishing firm granting the employees certain rights “such 
as seniority status, severance pay, etc.” Id. at 544–45. “The agreement did not 
contain an express provision making it binding on successors of [the firm.]” Id. 
at 544. The firm subsequently merged with another publishing firm, John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., and a dispute arose over whether the collective bargaining 
agreement survived the merger. See id. at 545 (“The Union’s position was that 
despite the merger . . . Wiley was obligated to recognize certain rights of [the] 
employees . . . . Wiley . . . asserted that the merger terminated the bargaining 
agreement for all purposes.”). In light of this dispute, the union sought 
arbitration. Id. at 546. 
The Court addressed “who shall decide whether the arbitration provisions of 
the collective bargaining agreement survived the . . . merger.” Id. at 546. The 
Court concluded that courts should decide this issue because a party cannot be 
compelled to arbitrate if the instrument that purports to require arbitration is 
not binding on the party. Id. at 547. That a court should decide this question did 
not, however, mean that Wiley was not bound to arbitrate. See id. at 547–48 
(holding that a merger does not necessarily extinguish the rights under a prior 
collective bargaining agreement and that “in appropriate circumstances, present 
here, the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union”). 
 156. Id. at 550–51. 
 157. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1372 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (emphasizing that the present dispute “arises in an entirely different 
context: an international investment treaty” and thus reliance upon domestic 
labor policy would be misplaced). 
 158. 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 159. See id. at 85 (concluding that the applicability of a time limit rule on 
seeking arbitration “falls within the class of gateway procedural disputes” that 
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concluding that the particular claims-processing issue in that 
case was for the arbitrator, the Court attempted to clarify that 
the First Options framework requiring a court to answer whether 
there is clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to arbitrate 
arbitrability is only triggered in certain circumstances, such as 
when there is “a gateway dispute about whether the parties are 
bound by a given arbitration clause” or when there is 
“disagreement about whether an arbitration clause in a 
concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of 
controversy.”160 Outside of such circumstances, certain 
“‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on 
its final disposition,” such as whether a precondition to 
arbitration has been satisfied, presumptively lie within the power 
of the arbitrator.161 
In BG Group, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the issues were 
substantive questions of arbitrability that a court and not an 
arbitrator should decide.162 Having determined that First Options 
supplied the appropriate test of party intent and that the facts in 
BG Group were sufficiently different from those in John Wiley 
and Howsam, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and 
vacated the award.163 
                                                                                                     
are presumptively for an arbitrator to decide). 
The dispute in Howsam concerned a business relationship between Dean 
Witter and Karen Howsam. Id. at 81. Howsam felt that Dean Witter made 
misrepresentations in providing investment advice and sought arbitration 
before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) per Dean Witter’s 
“standard Client Service Agreement’s arbitration clause.” Id. Among the 
NASD’s arbitration rules was a limitation that no dispute older than six years 
could be submitted to arbitration. Id. at 82. Dean Witter argued that Howsam’s 
claim was too old and sought the assistance of the courts to prevent arbitration. 
Id. Accordingly, the issue before the Supreme Court was “whether a court or an 
NASD arbitrator should apply the [time limit] rule to the underlying 
controversy.” Id. at 81. 
 160. Id. at 83–84. 
 161. Id. at 84–85 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162. See BG Grp., 665 F.3d at 1371 (“The Treaty [between the United 
Kingdom and Argentina] provides a prime example of a situation where the 
‘parties would likely have expected a court’ to decide arbitrability.” (quoting 
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83)). 
 163. See id. at 1373 (“[W]e conclude that there can be only one possible 
outcome on the [arbitrability question] before us, namely, that BG Group was 
required to commence a lawsuit in Argentina’s courts and wait eighteen months 
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IV. The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its Implications 
This Part examines the Supreme Court’s March 2014 
decision as well as its implications for international arbitration in 
the United States. Part IV.A briefly overviews how the parties 
framed the issues before the Court at oral argument; it then 
distills the main points from the majority and concurring 
opinions filed in the case.164 Part IV.B closes with a few 
observations on the practical impact of the Court’s decision on 
international investment treaty and international commercial 
arbitration in the United States.165 
A. Setting the Stage 
From the beginning of oral argument, BG parroted language 
it had used in presenting the question for certiorari: petitioner 
“ask[s] [the Court] to resolve this case narrowly by reaffirming 
that an arbitrator rather than a court presumptively resolves a 
dispute over a precondition to arbitration.”166 BG maintained that 
if the case fell under the ambit of the Howsam–First Options 
divide and the Court assigned the international component of the 
case little weight, BG should win because the litigation 
requirement in Article 8 of the BIT really resembles a “procedural 
precondition” to arbitration.167 BG then explained that if the 
                                                                                                     
before filing for arbitration pursuant to Article 8(3) if the dispute remained.” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); id. (“[W]e vacate the Final 
Award.”). 
 164. Infra Part IV.A.1–2. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent garnered the vote 
of one other: Justice Kennedy. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 
1198, 1203 (2014). 
 165. Infra Part IV.B. 
 166. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of 
Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138) (U.S. Dec. 2, 2013) at 3 
[hereinafter Or. Arg. Tr.] (beginning oral argument). Compare id. (framing of 
the issue by BG at oral argument), with Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, BG 
Grp. PLC v. Argentina (No. 12-138) (July 27, 2012) (“In disputes involving a 
multi-staged dispute resolution process, does a court or instead the arbitrator 
determine whether a precondition to arbitration has been satisfied?”). 
 167. See Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 5 (explaining that if the Court takes 
up the issue of consent, it could do so through three separate strains of 
analysis). See supra note 159 (explaining that the Howsam Court held that 
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Court were to focus on the international component,168 the FAA 
would still compel a ruling in BG’s favor because the parties were 
aware when they agreed to international arbitration in the 
United States that they were choosing U.S. arbitration law, 
including case law such as First Options and Howsam.169 
Following BG, DOJ argued as amicus curiae representing the 
interests of the United States. DOJ asked the Court to vacate the 
D.C. Circuit’s judgment and remand with instructions to apply a 
modified standard of review.170 DOJ emphasized the 
international component of the case, contending that “applying 
the domestic presumptions that are set forth in Howsam [and 
First Options] to this type of investor-state arbitration . . . would 
not be appropriate.”171 DOJ framed the issue as “a question of 
treaty interpretation, not a question of the likely expectations of 
parties to a domestic commercial contract.”172 
Speaking third, Argentina staked out its position that “[t]his 
is a contract formation case,” in keeping with its contention that 
its consent to arbitration was conditioned upon BG satisfying the 
litigation requirement.173 Argentina noted additionally that after 
                                                                                                     
certain procedural questions of arbitrability are presumptively within the power 
of the arbitrator to decide). 
 168. Cf. supra note 157 and accompanying text (noting that the D.C. Circuit 
in BG Group distinguished John Wiley on the basis that the latter concerned 
domestic labor policy). 
 169. See Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 6–7 (acknowledging the United 
Kingdom and Argentina did not know when signing the Treaty whether a 
dispute of this nature would be resolved by a court or an arbitrator, “but they 
d[id] know that the applicable law [would] be the [situs] of the arbitration”); id. 
at 7 (“[W]e are unaware of any precedent from any country ever that says we 
are going to not apply our domestic system set of rules, here the Howsam [and] 
[F]irst [O]ptions lines, because this is an international case.” (emphasis added)). 
 170. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Vacatur and 
Remand at 11–12, BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina (No. 12-138) (U.S. 
Sept. 3, 2013) (“In the distinct context of investor-state arbitral proceedings 
conducted pursuant to investment treaties, courts should not apply [the private 
commercial arbitration agreement] interpretive framework wholesale, but 
instead should review de novo arbitral rulings on consent-based objections to 
arbitration, and review deferentially rulings on other objections.”). 
 171. Id. at 27. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. at 37 (arguing that because the case is about Argentina’s 
consent to arbitrate, the D.C. Circuit’s result was correct under U.S. arbitration 
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an arbitral panel has issued a decision, national courts possess 
“judicial review” over certain jurisdictional questions, including 
whether an arbitration agreement was ever formed.174 Argentina 
tied the arbitrability question—whether BG had accepted 
Argentina’s offer—back into U.S. case law, arguing that under 
John Wiley175 a court decides this type of issue.176 
As noted above, the adverse parties both relied heavily on 
U.S. domestic arbitration precedents before the Supreme 
Court.177 DOJ stressed the international aspect of the case178 but 
failed to offer a principled means of distinguishing between treaty 
provisions that went to “consent” and those that were merely 
procedural.179 Viewed against this backdrop, neither the 
majority’s analysis nor its result is surprising. 
1. The Majority Opinion 
On March 5, 2014, Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the 
Court in BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina.180 The identity 
                                                                                                     
precedents and “treaty principles”). 
 174. See id. at 38 (arguing that “whether a contract was ever formed, [or] 
whether there ever was an agreement to arbitrate [are] ultimately . . . issue[s] 
for a court to independently de novo decide”). 
 175. For a summary of the pertinent part of the case, see supra note 155. 
 176. See Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 42 (noting that John Wiley held 
there is “independent judicial review” when the question concerns “whether 
there is an agreement to arbitrate at all between the parties”). 
 177. Supra notes 167–69, 175–76 and accompanying text. 
 178. Supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.  
 179. See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1209 
(2014) (“[W]hile we respect the Government’s views about the proper 
interpretation of treaties, we have been unable to find any other authority or 
precedent suggesting that the use of the ‘consent’ label in a treaty should make 
a critical difference . . . .” (citation omitted)); Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 32 
(“Is this litigation preliminary . . . a condition on the consent to arbitrate a 
dispute? . . . [A]fter looking at the sources that the United States is telling the 
Court it should look to, what is the answer of the United States to that 
question?”); id. at 33 (observing that DOJ’s position seems to discard “all the 
techniques that [the Court] use[s] in the Howsam–First Options line of cases” 
and fails to “replac[e] [them] with anything else” (emphasis added)). 
 180. 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1203 (2014). The majority opinion was joined in full by 
five other Justices: Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Kagan. Id. at 1203. 
Sotomayor joined all but one part and wrote a separate concurrence. Id. 
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of the author was telling—Justice Breyer penned the decisions in 
both First Options181 and Howsam.182 His authorship of BG Group 
signaled from the outset that the Court likely would not depart 
substantially, if at all, from its domestic precedents. The Justice 
cast the issue before the Court as follows: 
[W]hether a court of the United States, in reviewing an 
arbitration award made under the [United Kingdom–
Argentina bilateral investment] [t]reaty, should interpret and 
apply the local litigation requirement [in the BIT] de novo, or 
with the deference that courts ordinarily owe arbitration 
decisions. That is to say, who—court or arbitrator—bears 
primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the local 
litigation requirement to an underlying controversy?183 
After setting out the factual and procedural background,184 
Justice Breyer explained how the majority, in no more than ten 
pages in the U.S. Reports, would dispose of a case that had 
wreaked havoc in every previous forum: 
In answering the question, we shall initially treat the 
document before us as if it were an ordinary contract between 
private parties. Were that so, we conclude, the matter would 
be for the arbitrators. We then ask whether the fact that the 
document in question is a treaty makes a critical difference. 
We conclude that it does not.185 
Employing the legal fiction that a State-to-State Treaty is “an 
ordinary contract between private parties” allowed the majority 
to invoke and apply domestic precedents such as Howsam and 
First Options without pause.186 In turn, the majority instructed 
that under these authorities questions that go to substantive 
arbitrability, such as “‘whether the parties are bound by a given 
arbitration clause,’” are presumptively for a court to decide.187 By 
                                                                                                     
 181. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 940 (1995). 
 182. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 81 (2002). 
 183. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1203–04. 
 184. See id. at 1204–06 (summarizing events in Argentina, award of the 
arbitral tribunal, and the subsequent decisions of the lower U.S. federal courts). 
See supra Part III for a fuller account. 
 185. Id. at 1206. 
 186. See id. at 1206–07 (citing domestic arbitration cases). 
 187. Id. at 1206 (quoting Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84). 
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contrast, “disputes about the meaning and application of 
particular procedural preconditions for the use of arbitration” are 
presumptively for the arbitrator.188 
Having laid out the familiar Howsam–First Options 
formulation, the majority faced little difficulty reaching the 
conclusion that the host-country litigation requirement in the 
BIT was of the “procedural[] variety.”189 Relying on the structure 
of the dispute-resolution section of the BIT, as well as the BIT’s 
mandatory language in connection with resort to international 
arbitration, the Court reasoned that the litigation requirement 
“determines when the contractual duty to arbitrate arises, not 
whether there is a contractual duty to arbitrate at all.”190 Further, 
nothing in the BIT “give[s] substantive weight to the local court’s 
determinations on the matters at issue between the parties.”191 
As such, “the litigation provision is . . . a purely procedural 
requirement—a claims-processing rule that governs when the 
arbitration may begin, but not whether it may occur or what its 
substantive outcome will be on the issues in dispute.”192 
According to the majority, this requirement is “highly analogous” 
to other provisions the Court has deemed procedural in its 
domestic arbitration precedents.193 
The Court next “relaxed [its] ordinary contract assumption 
and ask[ed] whether the fact that the document before [it] is a 
treaty makes a critical difference to [its] analysis.”194 But the 
majority could find no authority that displaced the ordinary 
contract assumption.195 It declined DOJ’s invitation to grant the 
term “consent” in an international treaty talismanic significance, 
                                                                                                     
 188. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added). 
 189. See id. (observing that the “text and structure of the provision make 
clear that it operates as a procedural condition precedent to arbitration”). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. at 1207–08 (listing examples of various claims-processing rules 
found to be “procedural provisions”). 
 194. Id. at 1208. 
 195. See id. at 1209 (noting that the Court was “unable to find any other 
authority or precedent suggesting that the use of the ‘consent’ label in a treaty 
should make a critical difference in discerning the parties’ intent”). 
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noting that in the present case “we do not now see why the 
presence of the term ‘consent’ in a treaty warrants abandoning, or 
increasing the complexity of, our ordinary intent-determining 
framework.”196 Although the BIT did contain evidence of contrary 
intent, that is, a desire to have questions of arbitrability resolved 
by a court, the evidence was not sufficient to displace the 
ordinary contract presumption.197 
In sum, the Court articulated that, in matters involving 
vacatur or enforcement of investment treaty arbitration awards 
in the United States, arbitrators receive “considerable deference” 
when interpreting and applying procedural provisions, absent 
evidence of contrary intent that would displace this 
presumption.198 The Court closed: “Consequently, we conclude 
that the arbitrators’ jurisdictional determinations are lawful. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals to the contrary is reversed.”199 
2. Justice Sotomayor’s Concurrence 
One of the chief challenges facing those trying to understand 
and apply the majority’s decision will be determining its 
breadth.200 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence provides critical 
                                                                                                     
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1210 (explaining that a “treaty may contain evidence that show 
the parties had an intent contrary to our ordinary presumptions about who 
should decide threshold issues related to arbitration”). But the Court reasoned 
that “the text and structure of the litigation requirement . . . make clear that it 
is a procedural condition precedent to arbitration—a sequential step that a 
party must follow before giving notice of arbitration.” Id. “The Treaty nowhere 
says that the provision is to operate as a substantive condition on the formation 
of the arbitration contract, or that it is a matter of such elevated importance 
that it is to be decided by courts.” Id. 
 198. See id. (“A treaty may contain evidence that shows the parties had an 
intent contrary to our ordinary presumptions about who should decide threshold 
issues related to arbitration. But the treaty before us does not show any such 
contrary intention.”). 
 199. Id. at 1213. 
 200. See id. at 1209 (“We leave for another day the question of interpreting 
treaties that refer to ‘conditions of consent’ explicitly.”); Diane Marie Amann, 
Opinion Analysis: Clear Statement Ruling in Investor–State Arbitration Case 
Leaves Open Question on U.S. Bilateral Treaties, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2014, 
4:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/opinion-analysis-clear-statement-
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insight on this point because it emphasizes the narrowness of the 
majority’s precise holding.201 
Justice Sotomayor “agree[d] with the Court that the local 
litigation requirement at issue in this case is a procedural 
precondition to arbitration . . . , not a condition on Argentina’s 
consent to arbitrate . . . .”202 But the Justice felt it was important 
to acknowledge that if parties explicitly made such a requirement 
a condition on consent to arbitration, then the result might be 
different. She thought it was unnecessary and potentially 
troublesome for the Court to state in dicta that “a decision by 
treaty parties to describe a condition as one on their consent to 
arbitrate is unlikely to be conclusive in deciding whether the 
parties intended for the condition to be resolved by a court.”203 
B. Potential Implications for International Arbitration in the 
United States 
1. International Investment Treaty Arbitration 
As noted above, the Court’s decision in BG Group is its first-
ever pronouncement on ITA.204 If it had affirmed the D.C. Circuit, 
the Court would have signaled to investors and foreign countries 
that U.S. national courts are keen to intervene when arbitrability 
issues arise during or following an international arbitration.205 
                                                                                                     
ruling-in-investor-state-arbitration-case-leaves-open-question-on-u-s-bilateral-
treaties/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“Whether in some future case the Supreme 
Court will enforce such express provisions [as those conditions on consent in 
U.S. treaties] remains an open question.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 201. See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1213 
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that “I write separately because, 
in the absence of this express reservation [regarding what the majority has 
decided], the opinion might be construed otherwise”). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 204. Supra note 7. 
 205. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1371 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (reasoning that Argentina and the United Kingdom “likely never 
conceived of the need to specify that a court should decide whether Article 8(1) 
and (2)’s requirement that disputes first be brought to a court should be 
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Such a ruling might have proven a boon for critics who believe 
international arbitrators wield too much authority in the current 
ITA regime,206 but a bane to others who hold sacrosanct the 
autonomy of the international arbitral tribunal. To reach this 
result, the Court would have needed to conclude that the 
litigation requirement constituted a substantive question of 
arbitrability—a condition on Argentina’s consent to arbitrate—
the fulfillment of which a court should review independently.207 
Instead, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and ruled that 
under existing precedents the district court was correct to 
confirm the award, indicating that international arbitral awards 
receive significant deference from U.S. courts on questions of 
arbitrability.208 Extending existing domestic precedents might not 
have been the most elegant solution, but doing so established 
that questions of arbitrability, whether in domestic or 
international arbitration, will be reviewed under the same 
Howsam–First Options formulation.209 Specifically, it likely 
means that when a BIT states only an arbitral tribunal has the 
power to issue final and binding decisions, there is clear and 
unmistakable evidence under U.S. law that the treaty parties 
envisioned arbitrators, not a court, would decide whether 
procedural preconditions to arbitration have been satisfied.210 As 
                                                                                                     
respected”). “The [BIT] provides a prime example of a situation where the 
‘parties would likely have expected a court’ to decide arbitrability.” Id. (quoting 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)). 
 206. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment 
Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 391, 394 (2012) (contending that ITA insiders, 
including arbitrators, possess too much power and that “states . . . should sit at 
the top of the decisional hierarchy”). 
 207. See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1216 
(2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Submitting the dispute to the courts is . . . a 
condition to the formation of an agreement, not simply a matter of performing 
an existing agreement.”). Whether an investor has fulfilled the litigation 
requirement is “for a court, not an arbitrator, to decide.” Id. 
 208. Supra Part V.A.1. 
 209. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text (concluding no 
alternative mode of analysis was required by the Court even though BG Group 
concerned a BIT rather than an ordinary domestic contract). 
 210. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1210 (reasoning that “the text and structure of 
the litigation requirement set forth in [the BIT] make clear that it is a 
procedural condition” and that “[i]nternational arbitrators are likely more 
familiar than are judges with the expectations of foreign investors and recipient 
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such, investors and countries party to future disputes, as well as 
U.S. lower courts, which have not yet decided an ITA case post-
BG Group, now have a clearer idea of the applicable U.S. law on 
ITA.211 
2. International Commercial Arbitration 
The decision will also apply to international arbitration in 
the United States more broadly. As noted above, ITA and ICA 
draw on many of the same principles.212 Thus, parties to future 
international commercial arbitrations in the United States or 
those trying to enforce ICA awards in the United States will rely 
on BG Group for guidance.213 Private parties enjoy the speed and 
confidentiality that ICA provides.214 Confidentiality helps parties 
maintain a working relationship while they resolve disputes 
without attracting public scrutiny.215 But if the relationship has 
soured during a dispute such that one party petitions to vacate an 
award under the FAA, public court proceedings ensue and both 
parties lose the benefit of privacy.216 Accordingly, to the extent 
                                                                                                     
nations regarding the operation of the provision” (citation omitted)). 
 211. See supra Part II.E (describing the role of situs law). 
 212. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text (describing similarities). 
The BG Group decision will also influence resolution of arbitrability questions in 
wholly domestic cases. See, e.g., Joe v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of S. Carolina, CA 0:14-
159-CMC-SVH, 2014 WL 2094978, at *1–2 (D.S.C. May 20, 2014) (noting that 
employer moved to compel arbitration of race-discrimination claim and 
explaining that “[a]rbitrability questions, such as whether an arbitration clause 
covers a particular claim, are questions for the court to decide” (citing BG Grp., 
PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1206–07 (2014)); Klein v. ATP 
Flight Sch., LLP, 14-CV-1522 JFB GRB, 2014 WL 3013294, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 
3, 2014) (similar). Such domestic considerations are beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
 213. E.g., infra notes 218–21  and accompanying text. 
 214. See George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2012) (noting that “effective” 
commercial arbitration typically includes “speed, economy, informality, 
technical expertise, and avoidance of national fora”). 
 215. See BORN, supra note 4, at 15 (explaining that “most international 
business prefer, and actively seek, the privacy and confidentiality that the 
arbitral process offers” because it “focuses the parties on an amicable, business-
like resolution of their disagreements” (footnote omitted)). 
 216. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and 
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the BG Group decision may be read to hem in independent 
judicial review of arbitral awards and discourage vacatur 
proceedings,217 private parties may be more likely to site their 
commercials arbitrations or enforce their ICA awards in the 
United States. 
Thus far, U.S. lower courts have decided only a handful of 
cases touching on ICA since March 2014. For example, in 
Commissions Import Export S.A. v. Republic of the Congo,218 
plaintiff sought to collect on an English judgment that enforced 
an international commercial arbitration award.219 Although the 
panel held that the FAA did not preempt state law in this case 
and the panel did not rely on BG Group for its decision,220 it did 
cite BG Group for the proposition that the FAA “reflects a 
congressional judgment that the ‘emphatic federal policy in favor 
of arbitral dispute resolution . . . applies with special force in the 
field of international commerce.’”221 
                                                                                                     
Arbitral Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 234 (2005) (“[M]any vacatur 
proceedings [under the FAA] result in a complete re-enactment of the arbitral 
proceedings on a public record before a court. . . . An attempt to vacate the 
award will, therefore, result in destroying the confidentiality of arbitral 
proceedings.”). 
 217. See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1213 
(2014) (“We would not necessarily characterize [the] actions [by Argentina] as 
rendering [the] domestic court-exhaustion requirement ‘absurd and 
unreasonable,’ but at the same time we cannot say that the arbitrators’ 
conclusions are barred by the [BIT].”). 
 218. No. 13-CV-7004, 2014 WL 3377337 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 2014). 
 219. See id. at *1 (noting that plaintiff “prevailed in 2000 in an arbitration 
in Paris, France,” “obtain[ed] a judgment in 2009 from a court in England 
enforcing the arbitral award,” and ultimately “sued in the United States to 
enforce the foreign judgment under state law”). 
 220. Id. at *11 (“[W]e hold that the limitations period in [the FAA] does not 
preempt the longer limitations period in the D.C. Recognition Act for enforcing a 
foreign court judgment . . . . We remand the case for the district court to 
determine whether the English Judgment is enforceable under the D.C. 
Recognition Act.”). 
 221. Id. at 8 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)); see also Seed Holdings, Inc. v. Jiffy Int’l AS, 13 
CIV. 2284 JGK, 2014 WL 1141717, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2014) (reviewing 
an ICA award and noting the distinction between substantive and procedural 
questions of arbitrability (citing BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. 
Ct. 1198, 1206–08 (2014)). 
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In Ecopetrol S.A. v. Offshore Exploration and Production 
L.L.C.,222 Ecopetrol S.A., the national oil company of Colombia,223 
and the Korean National Oil Corporation (Purchasers) sought to 
enforce two arbitral awards against Offshore Exploration and 
Production L.L.C. (Offshore).224 Offshore is a Delaware 
corporation with its principal place of business in Houston, 
Texas.225 Offshore argued that one of the awards “should be 
vacated because the arbitral panel incorrectly determined that it 
had jurisdiction over the dispute underlying the award.”226 But 
the district court in the Southern District of New York rejected 
this argument, noting that “[w]hen parties have clearly and 
unmistakably submitted a disputed issue for arbitration, an 
arbitral panel’s decision should rarely be set aside.”227 The court 
relied on BG Group to support the proposition that because 
Offshore did not dispute that the parties agreed to allow the 
arbitrators to rule on objections to their jurisdiction, “the familiar 
and deferential standards that apply to judicial review of arbitral 
awards apply to review of the arbitral panel’s determination that 
it had jurisdiction to issue the . . . Award.”228 
As more U.S. lower courts have occasion to consider vacatur 
and enforcement of ICA awards in the coming years, the citations 
to BG Group will increase, and parties must understand where 
certain dispute-resolution provisions fall on the substantive–
procedural arbitrability spectrum. 
V. An Improved Host-Country Litigation Requirement 
Although U.S. law on ITA may be clearer after BG Group, 
the question persists: What can Argentina and other similarly 
                                                                                                     
 222. No. 14 Civ. 529 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2014). 
 223. Offshore Exploration & Prod. L.L.C. v. Morgan Stanley Private Bank, 
N.A., 986 F. Supp. 2d 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 224. See Ecopetrol, No. 14 Civ. 529, at *1 (“The Purchasers now seek to 
confirm the Interim Award and the Supplemental Interim Award . . . .”). 
 225. Offshore, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
 226. Ecopetrol, No. 14 Civ. 529, at *9 (footnote omitted). 
 227. Id. (citation omitted). 
 228. Id. 
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situated countries do to more effectively protect their sovereignty 
in bilateral investments treaties? Commentators have noted that 
“[i]f investment arbitration is to fulfill its promise[,] . . . some 
mechanism must be found to promote greater sensitivity to vital 
host state interests.”229 The answer may be an improved host-
country litigation requirement: 
[A] lot of times nobody think[s] that’s going to change 
anything, but you can understand Argentina or any other 
country saying, look, before we’re going to arbitrate, you know, 
try our courts, you may find—you may be surprised, right?230 
This Part contends that ITA participants should heed Chief 
Justice Roberts’s admonition to BG at oral argument.231 Part V.A 
proposes language that treaty drafters should consider drawing 
from or incorporating if they wish to create or restructure a 
dispute-resolution mechanism that includes a host-country 
litigation requirement.232 Part V.B explains how the proposed 
language avoids specific problems that arose in BG Group and 
asserts that an improved litigation requirement combats the 
broader criticism that the current ITA regime does not 
adequately protect host-country sovereignty.233 
A. Proposed Language to Consider 
The language below is not intended to be lifted from the page 
and stuck directly into the dispute-resolution section of a 
bilateral investment treaty. As with any agreement, the unique 
bargaining positions and goals of the contracting parties will 
heavily inform the drafting of the document, including the 
                                                                                                     
 229. Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of 
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 399 (2003). 
 230. Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 11 (questioning of BG by Chief Justice 
Roberts). 
 231. See also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1219 
(2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is no trifling matter for a sovereign nation 
to subject itself to suit by private parties; we do not presume that any country—
including our own—takes that step lightly.” (citation omitted)). 
 232. Infra Part V.A. 
 233. Infra Part V.B. 
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dispute-resolution mechanism.234 Further, it would be foolish to 
think this Note sets forth language immune from the 
interpretation controversies that haunt all complex 
agreements.235 
But given that “[m]ore than 1,300 of [the] 2,857 bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) [in effect at the end of 2012] . . . have 
reached their ‘anytime termination phase,’”236 with a total of 
1,598 projected to have reached that stage by 2018,237 countries 
should be increasingly eager to modify existing BITs or tailor new 
ones to their liking.238 With that in mind, the language below 
seeks to generate ideas on how treaty partners can incorporate a 
host-country litigation requirement that increases respect for 
national sovereignty and aids arbitrators in later proceedings 
while still affording investments sufficient protection: 
All disputes shall be finally resolved by international 
arbitration. Prior to arbitration, the complaining party shall 
submit the dispute to the national courts of the country in 
which the investment is located. During these proceedings, the 
parties to the dispute shall undertake good-faith efforts to 
brief factual issues occurring or having occurred in the host 
country and legal issues involving host-country law. The 
courts shall apply the host-country law in effect at the time 
the investment was made, unless the parties to the dispute 
agree otherwise. 
Upon the earlier of a dispositive decision by a host-country 
court or eighteenth months, either party to the dispute may 
request arbitration. Before issuing a final award, the arbitral 
tribunal shall review findings of fact and legal determinations 
concerning host-country law made by the host-country’s 
courts. The arbitral tribunal shall apply the host-country law 
                                                                                                     
 234. Cf. supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (emphasizing the 
consensual nature of arbitration). 
 235. For an excellent volume on treaty interpretation issues in ITA, see 
generally J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION (2012). 
 236. UNCTAD Inv. Rpt., supra note 2, at x. 
 237. Id. at 109. 
 238. Id. (“The significant number of expired or soon-to-expire BITs creates 
distinct opportunities for updating and improving the [international investment 
arbitration] regime.”). 
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in effect at the time the investment was made, unless the 
parties to the dispute agree otherwise. 
The arbitral tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear any 
objections that the above requirement to litigate in the host-
country’s courts has not been satisfied. 
B. Avoiding the Pitfalls in BG Group and Addressing Broader 
Criticisms of the International Investment Treaty Arbitration 
Regime 
1. Good-Faith Obligation 
Throughout the proceedings, BG contended that nothing 
productive would have come from litigating in the Argentine 
courts prior to arbitration.239 That may be true under the letter of 
the United Kingdom–Argentina BIT because it does not require 
that the parties litigate vigorously or until a court issues a 
decision, only that the parties to the dispute maintain a case in 
the Argentine courts for eighteen months.240 By including a 
good-faith obligation to litigate, the proposed language 
incentivizes investors and host countries to develop a record in 
the host-country’s courts.241 Even if they do not, there is still 
recourse to arbitration after a period of time.242 
                                                                                                     
 239. See, e.g., Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 57–58 (suggesting that BG 
could have simply filed in the Argentine courts and then waited eighteen 
months without doing anything else to fulfill the litigation requirement). 
 240. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text (laying out the dispute-
resolution section from the BIT); Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 45–47 
(questioning whether the eighteen-month requirement was really useful for the 
parties and a condition on consent to arbitration when BG could have simply 
filed a suit in the courts and “ke[pt] it alive perfunctorily” to satisfy the 
requirement). 
 241. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 70 (“At time tribunals will 
have to consider findings of domestic law by national courts, tribunals, or 
regulatory bodies on the status of investments in domestic legal systems.”). “[I]n 
the absence of any evidence that the findings are tainted by some lack of due 
process, deference should be shown to decisions of domestic courts or tribunals.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 242. Supra Part V.A. 
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2. Stabilization of Applicable Host-Country Law 
Effective usage of stabilization clauses in individual 
commercial agreements between foreign investors and countries 
inspires their inclusion here.243 During development of the record 
in the host-country courts, the stabilization clauses protect 
investors from adverse changes in host-country law.244 The 
proposed language freezes applicable host-country law for the 
purposes of litigation and arbitration at that which is in effect 
when an investment is made. It ensures that the host country 
cannot legislate to the detriment of investors after an investment 
is made, a fundamental goal of BITs.245 Accordingly, investors 
would be able to learn on the front-end the contours of the 
domestic law that will apply if a dispute arises. For example, in 
disputes involving regulatory expropriation by the host country, 
the investor could point to the text of the BIT to support its 
position on applicable host-country law rather than hoping an 
arbitral tribunal will later discard the litigation requirement 
because it believes the host country impeded the investor’s ability 
to litigate in the courts, as was the case in BG Group.246 Instead 
of stabilizing the law at the time the treaty is signed for all 
investments ever made under the BIT, the proposed language 
freezes host-country law at the time of investment for particular 
investments, allowing the host country to retain more legislative 
flexibility.247 
                                                                                                     
 243. Supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra Part II.C (describing the role of host-country law in 
international arbitration). 
 245. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that a goal of BITs 
generally is the “stabilizing effect . . . of preserving a particular set of host state 
policies”). “The role of the BIT . . . is to stabilize . . . obligations, either to 
reassure investors or to prevent an easy reversal of the underlying policies, and 
to publicize the stabilization.” Id. 
 246. Supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (suggesting that countries 
typically refrain from including stabilization clauses in treaties). 
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3. Clear Deference to the Arbitral Tribunal on Challenges to 
Compliance with the Litigation Requirement 
The amount of discretion and deference that should be 
afforded arbitrators was a major point of contention in BG Group. 
As noted above, the Court’s opinion invoked the substantive–
procedural delineation for whether questions of arbitrability are 
for a court or an arbitrator.248 However, given that BITs rarely 
mirror one another exactly, it is difficult to say, based on BG 
Group, which side of the substance–procedure divide provisions 
from other treaties would fall if reviewed by a U.S. court or 
another national court.249 
The proposed language avoids this issue by clearly 
committing to the arbitral tribunal challenges regarding 
fulfillment of the litigation requirement.250 But it also requires 
arbitral tribunals to examine host-country rulings before issuing 
a final decision.251 The language does not mandate the tribunal 
follow a particular standard of review. The goal is to require 
arbitrators to consider host-country court findings without 
imposing an artificial standard likely to engender unnecessary 
acrimony over whether the standard has been correctly 
employed.252 In this way, the language attempts to encourage 
sequential review of certain issues but does not contemplate a 
separate judicial body would substantively review the decisions of 
the arbitrators. 
VI. Conclusion 
In the foreseeable future, direct international arbitration 
between foreign investors and host countries will remain the 
                                                                                                     
 248. Supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra Part IV.A.2 (describing Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence and 
her emphasis on the narrowness of the Court’s decision). 
 250. Supra Part V.A. 
 251. Supra Part V.A. 
 252. But cf. Bjorklund, supra note 26, at 812–13 (advocating for “sequential 
review” in order to “maximize[] the dispensation of justice to a particular 
investor and minimize[] intrusion on the sovereignty of the state whose system 
is being called into question”). 
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dominant method of conclusively resolving investment disputes 
arising out of international treaties. It is paramount to many 
foreign investors that BITs include access to a neutral, 
independent tribunal to ensure protection of investments. But 
many critics and countries argue that the current international 
investment treaty arbitration regime does not take adequate 
measure of national sovereignty concerns. The case of BG Group, 
PLC v. Republic of Argentina throws this theme into sharp relief. 
By the plain text of the BIT, Argentina required any U.K. 
investor to litigate in its courts before seeking arbitration. But 
arbitration was held in the United States before either BG or 
Argentina had litigated, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States determined it should not disturb the findings of the 
arbitrators. 
The facts and ultimate legal disposition of BG Group should 
prompt countries to consider implementing or improving host-
country litigation requirements in their BITs. Such requirements, 
drawing from the concepts mentioned above, would help the ITA 
system reach the proper balance between national sovereignty 
and investment protection. 
